ABSTRACT  Project Camelot, a military-sponsored, social science study of revolution, was cancelled in 1965 amidst international and national discussion about the study’s political implications. Subsequently, Camelot became the focus of a wide-ranging controversy about the connections between Cold War politics, military patronage, and American social science. This paper argues that following Camelot’s demise, efforts to rethink the politics–patronage–social science nexus became an important part of what historian Peter Novick has called ‘the epistemological revolution that began in the 1960s’. Novick claims that ‘strictly academic’ considerations provided the categories of analysis that challenged the scholarly mainstream’s commitment to objectivity and related ideals, like value-neutrality and professional autonomy. In contrast, my analysis – which discusses post-WWII military patronage for the social sciences, Camelot’s origins and cancellation, the ensuing controversy, and some long-term implications of this controversy – underscores the centrality of political developments and political concerns in that epistemological revolution.

Keywords  counter-insurgency, ideology, objectivity, SORO, value-neutrality

Project Camelot and the 1960s
Epistemological Revolution:
Rethinking the Politics–Patronage–Social Science Nexus

Mark Solovey

The influence of political decisions and climates on social research is not new, but the fact that this can no longer be ignored is. Camelot, a proposed international social science research project sponsored by the Army Research Office of the United States Department of Defense, was the turning point.¹

(Anthropologist Ralph L. Beals, 1969)

Project Camelot, a 1960s military-sponsored study of the revolutionary process, had a curiously brief existence, yet it also left an important legacy. Camelot’s projected cost of six million US dollars would have made it the largest social science project in US history, but international complaints about this study’s imperialistic implications led in mid-1965 to its cancellation, before Camelot had even moved beyond the planning stage. Camelot’s full importance became manifest only in the following years, as this study became the focal point of an extensive controversy about the relationship between American politics, military patronage, and American social science.²
Camelot thus became an important episode in the long-standing (and still ongoing) debate about the nature of the social science enterprise. Ever since the emergence of professional social science in the United States during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, scholars, patrons and consumers of social research have argued about the relationships between inquiry and politics, research and reform, scholarship and ideology. From the 1940s until the early 1960s especially, the dominant sentiment held that the social sciences were junior partners to the natural sciences. This position implied that the former needed to follow in the footsteps of the latter, which, by further implication, required a clear-cut, impermeable boundary between science and politics. But as the decade of the 1960s unfolded, the social sciences became major participants in what historian Peter Novick has called ‘the epistemological revolution that began in the 1960s’.

At the heart of this revolution, according to Novick, was a multifaceted scholarly challenge to the dominant post-WWII model of social science inquiry based upon an idealized positivist and empiricist image of the natural sciences – an image that posited an objective, value-neutral scholarly enterprise whose intellectual practices and products were well insulated from ‘extra-scientific’ or ‘external’ social influences. Novick suggests, for example, that currents in the history and philosophy of science, including Thomas Kuhn’s work on scientific revolutions, sometimes helped to undermine commitments to mainstream academic paradigms that looked to the natural sciences for guidance. Elsewhere, scholarly interest in literary theory and hermeneutics drew attention to the problems involved in interpreting the meaning of human action, problems whose proper study seemed to require tools of analysis that the natural sciences could not provide. Focusing on these and other scholarly developments, Novick argues that

... although the highly charged political atmosphere of the period sometimes raised the stakes of controversies about objectivity in the social sciences, it was for the most part ‘strictly academic’ considerations which initiated debates, and contributed the categories in which heterodox views were advanced.

Without denying the importance of these ‘academic’ contributions, I suggest that this historical interpretation needs to be revised, for as the Camelot controversy reveals, political developments and political concerns had a central place in the 1960s challenge to scientific objectivity, and to related ideals like value-neutrality and professional autonomy in American social science.

My analysis of the Camelot controversy highlights the importance of the politics–patronage–social science nexus in the epistemological revolution. I want to make three main points. First, far from being an internal scholarly affair, the 1960s challenge to the then-dominant view of the social sciences, which suggested that they should follow the lead of the natural sciences, became by mid-decade a national political affair. In this
turn of events, the Camelot controversy played a key rôle by making the intellectual status and political import of the social sciences the subject of a wide-ranging national controversy, thus accomplishing what scholars critical of orthodox social science had by themselves not done. Second, this public context inspired changes in the parameters of discussion, as scholars (together with politicians, and sometimes other observers) now focused on the importance of Cold War politics and military patronage in shaping (and perhaps distorting) American social science. Third, in the wake of Camelot, critical consideration of the politics–patronage–social science nexus helped to strengthen opposition to the orthodox understanding of social science as an objective, value-neutral scholarly enterprise immune to extra-scientific (and especially political or ideological) influences.

At the outset I should note that although the ways in which the particular disciplines participated in, and were affected by, the epistemological revolution varied significantly – a point emphasized by Novick – this paper largely puts aside questions about variation across the disciplines. This is because my main focus is on salient changes in the politics–patronage–social science nexus during the 1960s that were not limited to a single discipline, and on efforts to criticize and analyse this nexus (and thus to rethink the nature of American social science) in a global manner.

Military Patronage and the Quest for Scientific Legitimacy in the Early Post-WWII Period

Since the problems concerning Project Camelot and the politics–patronage–social science nexus were rooted in developments since the 1940s, it is important to begin by considering the creation of a post-war partnership between the social sciences and the military. In the early post-WWII years, social scientists faced widespread scepticism about their political significance and scientific credentials. In this context, the development of a partnership with the military helped social scientists in their quest for public respectability and scientific legitimacy. Although, in retrospect, it seems clear that military support left a deep imprint on the institutional conditions, intellectual orientation and political significance of academic social research, the threats of political subordination and loss of intellectual independence seemed at the time to be manageable; it seemed, to many key players at least, that social research carried out with military funding could contribute to important Cold War goals without losing its objectivity and other ‘scientific’ characteristics. In fact, the military took a special interest in social research that appeared to be rigorously scientific – meaning, much like natural science research.

Following World War II, a new politics of American science presented a number of difficulties for social scientists as they sought funding and public support. Although social scientists had participated extensively in the Allied war effort, their contributions were overshadowed by the remarkable achievements of natural scientists, especially physical scientists whose work led to the atom bomb, radar, and other weapons used against
the Axis powers. By the end of the war, preparations to establish adequate post-war support for American science concentrated on the natural sciences as well.8

The early history of the US National Science Foundation made the peripheral status and questionable scientific credentials of the social sciences painfully evident. In an effort to create a comprehensive, post-war federal science agency, the question of whether or not the social sciences should even be included generated extensive controversy, as a variety of critics doubted that the social science were more than distant cousins of the natural sciences. After more than half a decade of national debate on this and other matters, a 1950 legislative act created the National Science Foundation, or ‘NSF’. Permissive wording in NSF’s charter left the support of the social sciences up in the air, a matter to be (re)considered by the Foundation’s predominantly natural-science leaders. Though this agency was much smaller than originally envisioned, its legislative history still demonstrated just how far the social sciences were from the centre of national concern. Subsequently, NSF’s hesitating, cautious entry into the social sciences helped to confirm their marginal position.9

So did the overwhelming natural-science bias in post-war military science programmes. These sprang up during the late 1940s to fill the gap created by the delay in NSF’s establishment.10 The case of the Office of Naval Research (ONR) is revealing. By the end of the first post-war decade, ONR had become the most important federal patron of academic science: but, from the social sciences, only psychology received substantial support from ONR.11

Social scientists also had to confront the fact that physical scientists dominated the key federal wartime and post-war science advisory posts. In NSF’s origins, it became clear that few if any natural scientists were committed to the notion that the social sciences deserved comparable public support, recognition or influence. By occupying top positions in such important settings as the Office of Scientific Research and Development, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), NSF, and the President’s Science Advisory Committee, these same natural scientists of the Manhattan Project generation exercised substantial influence over the nation’s scientific development.12 Within this elite circle, social scientists were notable mainly by their absence.

Considerable scepticism about the intellectual foundations and political meaning of social science, and sometimes hostility from conservative politicians in the Congress, caused further problems. Conservative political opponents, who associated social science with New Deal liberalism, racial equality and – worst of all – Marxist socialism and communism, joined forces with sceptical natural scientists to prevent social science from obtaining a major presence in the new National Science Foundation; at one point it looked as if conservatives had managed to exclude what they saw as partisan (and thus unscientific) social disciplines altogether.13 The power of conservative politicians only increased as the Cold War became an ongoing international emergency, supporting the growth of rampant
domestic anti-communism. Through the mid-1950s, individual social scientists, social science organizations and their patrons, especially the large private foundations, became frequent targets of university, state and national investigations into subversive, un-American activities.14

Under these conditions, the establishment of amiable relations with the military became particularly appealing. Beginning with its first serious involvement with the social sciences during World War I, the military demonstrated a special interest in psychological expertise.15 During World War II and the Cold War, the expertise of psychologists, psychiatrists, and professionals in related areas seemed especially relevant to military and intelligence operations. Psychologists proclaimed that their work was perhaps even more valuable than military hardware in winning the allegiances of foreign governments and peoples. This viewpoint gained substantial support among American foreign policy experts who were interested in the ‘Communist Mind’ and concerned about communist efforts to control the psyches of peoples in nations around the world, including the United States. As suggested by Cold War rhetoric on both sides of the Iron Curtain, this conflict was not only about economics, politics and military might, but also about competing worldviews and ideologies. From this perspective, the major stakes included the hearts and minds of individuals, subjects about which psychologists presumably knew more than anybody else did. Not surprisingly, throughout this period psychology’s most important extra-university patron was the military.16

In an impressive range of cases, the military stimulated the growth of other social sciences as well. Political studies on nuclear strategy, including such central Cold War doctrines as deterrence and mutual assured destruction, received the Department of Defense (DOD)’s attention.17 The RAND Corporation, the most famous of the military think tanks, facilitated research on nuclear strategy, as well as on operations research and systems theory – research which drew from a number of social science disciplines, but especially economics.18 Economists interested in game theory also worked at RAND, while enjoying support from other DOD science programmes as well.19 The large private foundations – Carnegie, Rockefeller and Ford – together with national security agencies, pushed for and financed the development of the Harvard and Columbia Russian studies programmes, MIT’s Center for International Studies and, more generally, the proliferation of area studies programmes throughout American higher education.20 In these settings, social scientists from varied disciplinary backgrounds pursued investigations in such cutting-edge fields as modernization and development studies,21 which together with social systems analysis later became part of Project Camelot. The rapid growth of communications studies also depended heavily on military and intelligence agencies for support.22

While this discussion is not meant to be comprehensive, it does indicate that military funding and related programmes of patronage provided valuable sustenance for many prominent developments in post-war
social science. Based on recent scholarly contributions and his own extensive work on this topic, Christopher Simpson has concluded that ‘military, intelligence, and propaganda agencies provided by far the largest part of the funds for large research projects in the social sciences in the United States from World War II until well into the 1960s’.

The general goal of the military’s growing commitment to the social sciences was eminently practical, involving DOD’s immense managerial tasks. Charles Bray served as a member of the Smithsonian Institution’s Research Group in Psychology and the Social Sciences, which under military contract carried out social science planning studies. The title of Bray’s 1962 published account in the *American Psychologist*, ‘Toward a Technology of Human Behavior for Defense Use’, underscored the military’s practical interests in the social sciences. DOD’s basic aim in sponsoring social research was, in Bray’s words, ‘to lay the basis for an overall increase in the sophistication and inventiveness with which Defense management meets [problems related to] the expansion of military operations … into new social settings’. Just as research in the natural sciences and engineering had improved DOD’s ‘sophistication and inventiveness about the production of physical objects’, research in the social sciences would presumably improve the military’s ‘sophistication and inventiveness about people’.

In speaking of a ‘technology of human behavior’, Bray drew upon a pervasive postwar rhetoric that portrayed social science as a junior – but rapidly maturing – colleague to natural science within a unified scientific enterprise. Disciplinary histories suggest that a pronounced emphasis on proper methodology during these years was often considered by social scientists to be the key to making social inquiry truly ‘scientific’. This position resonated with cultural programmes for a modern, secular society that took as their basis a cosmopolitan, universalized vision of scientific inquiry. The social science emphasis on scientific unity through methodology also served at the National Science Foundation and elsewhere as a strategy for strengthening the shaky scientific status of social inquiry.

In the case of military science programmes, a dominant orientation toward the physical sciences meant that social scientists, if they did not want to be viewed as imposters, had to display their scientific stripes prominently. Consistently, social scientists as individuals and members of advisory committees emphasized that social research that had much in common with natural science inquiry was the type that had the greatest potential benefit to the military. The point that social science comprised a vital component of the sciences rather than the humanities came through again and again in their writings. This message also stood out in the first report on the social sciences from the physical-sciences-dominated President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). According to this landmark 1962 statement:

> Progress in behavioral science has come about by using the scientific processes of observing, experimenting, and extensively following up and correcting working hypotheses. Indeed, all the general attitudes and
strategies of physical and biological science have found a place in behavioral science.28

PSAC’s use of the term ‘behavioral science(s)’ rather than the more traditional ‘social science(s)’ was revealing, as it reflected the improved status of the social disciplines within the national science establishment. Since social science had been associated with supposedly un-American programmes of social reform (and sounded suspiciously like socialism), leading scholars and their patrons often looked for other words to signify a stronger commitment to a hard-core type of science. During the 1950s, the Ford Foundation helped to propagate this message through its Behavioral Sciences Program.29

The hard-core, technocratic orientation of military-sponsored social research faithfully mirrored the ‘behavioral sciences’ rhetoric. Recent scholarship on social science and its ties to the national security state suggests that such research typically aimed to facilitate prediction and control, qualities often considered, at least since the time of the 17th-century Scientific Revolution, to be hallmarks of ‘science’. During World War II, psychologists, anthropologists, and other scholars working in the field of culture and personality studies, all sought to predict national behaviour as part of wartime operations.30 In the case of communications studies, scholars with close ties to psychological warfare programmes contributed to building, as Christopher Simpson has aptly put it, a ‘science of coercion’. Its scholarly products would enable American political leaders to control beliefs and attitudes within target populations, both domestic and foreign.31 Similarly, the field of modernization studies had a decidedly manipulative bent. Based upon the notion that underdeveloped countries were especially vulnerable to Communist penetration, scholars set out to identify the key variables and stages in the process of development, with the hope that the resulting knowledge would enable US leaders to direct this process in a manner favourable to American interests.32

Military social research efforts typically deployed ‘hard’ scientific methodologies as well. This meant a marked preference for quantitative analysis as opposed to historical, qualitative, and other forms of social research that seemed ‘soft’ by comparison. Charles Bray emphasized that behavioural technology was ‘based on controlled observation, and, preferably… expressed in formulas, tables, and graphs. That is to say, it is not only tested but it is quantitative information that is needed’.33 To take just one specific, salient case, in the early development of operations research and systems analysis, mathematicians, engineers and physical scientists led the way. As the historian of technology Thomas Hughes has pointed out, ‘from operations research, systems analysis borrowed holistic, transdisciplinary characteristics and the reliance on natural scientists and scientifically trained engineers and their methods’.34 In order for social scientists to become participants, they had to display certain skills and methods of analysis. Competence in mathematics and quantitative cost-benefit analysis helped economists, in particular, to gain credibility. So much so that
during the early 1960s, the new Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara recruited systems experts, many with backgrounds in economics, to help place the management of military affairs on a rational, scientific basis.35

On top of this, military support during the early post-war period promised to leave scholarly objectivity, autonomy and independence intact. In the 1940s and 1950s, authors from the natural and social sciences, as well as from the history, philosophy, and sociology of science, commonly distinguished between science and politics, research and reform, scholarship and ideology. Though nuanced differences of opinion and some strongly contrary perspectives persisted, the dominant sentiment held that patrons and their beneficiaries should not confuse the two sides in these pairs. Classic cases of the Soviet State corrupting genetics, and of the Nazi State destroying parts of its scientific community, provided frequently repeated lessons about what could go wrong.36 Of course, military support raised the spectre of State domination of science at home as well,37 but many observers at the time found that certain features of postwar American science seemed to militate against this possibility. These features included the military’s extensive reliance on universities as sites of research and training; its regular use of university scholars as advisors; the existence of pluralistic sources of public and private support; and the cultivation of a ‘basic’ science component within military research programmes. Scientists pointed, for example, to the Office of Naval Research as a major patron that respected the special needs of science.38 These circumstances help to explain the fact that, as historian Allan Needell has observed, ‘the potential impact of such support [from military and intelligence agencies] – direct or indirect – on the quality and independence of research and on the teaching of these subjects remained largely unevaluated’, at least until the 1960s.39 In short, the theory and practice of science suggested that academic researchers could feed at the public trough without becoming subordinate to political power.

So President Eisenhower’s famous warning that dependence on the federal patron could harm American science came, especially as far as the social sciences were concerned, at an awkward moment. In his 1961 Farewell Presidential Address, Eisenhower noted that with the passage of time, the threat of political subordination had grown stronger. As scientific research became increasingly costly, more of it was conducted directly and indirectly for the American government, contributing to the growth of what Eisenhower called the ‘military–industrial complex’, and what later commentators referred to as the ‘military–industrial–academic complex’. In this situation, there was a great danger that government contracts would become ‘virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity’. ‘The prospect of domination of the nation’s scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is’, cautioned the ex-military general, ‘ever present’.40

The soon-to-be ex-President made his dire remarks following the success of social scientists in obtaining at least a small space and moderate scientific credentials within the expanding federal science system. This had
not been easy, for they first had to demonstrate their true ‘scientific’
colours and practical worth to more powerful players whose main concerns
often lay elsewhere. A growing partnership with the military indicated that
social scientists had made some progress; they had acquired a measure of
respect from a patron that stood for American might and national vigour.
Additionally, they had done so while apparently retaining – and even
strengthening – the institutional conditions, social relations, methodo-
logical practices, epistemological goals and habits of mind commonly
associated with rigorous scientific inquiry. Thus social scientists and the
military seemed to be working together on projects of common interest,
without contaminating social inquiry with unscientific ideology or values.
The politics–patronage–social science nexus seemed to be working well.

Moving Toward the Political Centre Stage: Planning for
Project Camelot

Whereas the social sciences had been a prime target of conservative
political attacks during the first postwar decade, the public status of these
disciplines rose dramatically during the liberal Democratic administrations
of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. In the history of American
social science, these years were truly remarkable, as scholars from all of the
major disciplines – psychology, sociology, political science, economics,
anthropology – helped to shape major domestic and foreign policy ini-
tiatives. Kennedy himself had a well-known enthusiasm for scholars who
could straddle the worlds of academia and politics comfortably, the so-
called ‘action intellectuals’ or ‘policy scientists’. Though he was not so
popular with this group as Kennedy had been, Johnson, as the nation’s new
leader following Kennedy’s assassination in late 1963, came to depend
even more heavily upon advisory groups and individuals with extensive
academic connections.41 Within the social sciences, no study reflected their
rapidly rising (and soon to be widely challenged) position better than
Project Camelot. Rooted deeply in the post-war partnership with the
military, Camelot promised to provide American social scientists with
abundant resources and opportunities to fulfil the twin goals of producing
first-rate science and solving important political problems.

During his 1960 presidential campaign, Kennedy promised to correct
what he took to be a flawed national defence policy. The Eisenhower
administration’s emphasis on preparation for full-scale nuclear war and the
threat of massive retaliation seemed inadequate in light of changing Cold
War politics. Soon after assuming the presidential office, Kennedy de-
ivered a message to the Congress outlining the need for new military
capabilities to meet novel foreign policy challenges. Only two months
before, Soviet leader Nikita Krushchev had announced that his country
would support ‘national liberation wars’, a policy soon adopted by Com-
munist China, as indicated in the Peking People’s Daily: ‘The Communists
of all countries ... must ... resolutely support wars of national liberation’.
To combat this style of communist aggression, Kennedy called upon the
American military to strengthen its ability to identify pockets of Communist-supported revolutionary activity, and respond with conventional and counter-insurgency forces.42

Against this background, DOD's internal and external social research programmes underwent an impressive expansion. Between 1960 and 1966, the annual budget of DOD's Research, Development, Test and Evaluation programme in counter-insurgency alone grew from $10 million to $160 million. Of the latter figure, $6 million went to social science research, or 'non-material research' as it was sometimes referred to by military personnel.43 From 1961 to 1964, DOD support for research in the psychological sciences rose from $17.2 million to $31.1 million, while its support for research in the social sciences (not including psychology) increased from $0.2 million to $5.7 million.44

The immediate impetus for Project Camelot came in 1964, when DOD's Director of Defense Research and Engineering asked the Defense Science Board (a high-level military science advisory group) to study existing research programmes 'relating to ethnic and other motivational factors involved in the causation and conduct of small wars'. The resulting report, after noting various deficiencies in DOD's behavioural sciences programme, identified a need to improve 'the knowledge and understanding in depth of the internal cultural, economic and political conditions that generate conflicts between national groups'. Better understanding required greater emphasis on the collection of primary data in overseas areas. The Defense Science Board also criticized DOD's failure to 'organize appropriate multidisciplinary programs and to use the techniques of such related fields as operations research'. In response to such criticisms, the Army began to develop an ambitious research programme, known as Project Camelot, to study revolutionary movements and counter-insurgency tactics.45

Camelot's detailed planning lay in the hands of the Special Operations Research Office (SORO). Created in 1956, SORO was a military-supported, quasi-independent research institute, located on the campus of American University in Washington, DC, that served as the main centre for Army-contract research in the behavioural sciences. Over half of SORO's personnel produced handbooks on countries throughout the world, providing information on social structures, political and economic systems, and revolutionary potential. One such handbook had the not-too-subtle title 'How Americans Serving Abroad Can Help the Free World Win the Battle of Ideas in the Cold War'. SORO also established a Counter-insurgency Information Analysis Center for the purpose of storing and transmitting information that SORO collected and produced. Though initially SORO's activities involved little field research, SORO soon became a major centre for this type of inquiry as well.46

A SORO description of Project Camelot explained its integrated scientific and political objectives. First, Camelot would 'devise procedures for assessing the potential for internal war within national societies'. Second, this study would 'identify with increased degrees of confidence
those actions which a government might take to relieve conditions which
are assessed as giving rise to a potential for internal war'. Third, Camelot
would ‘assess the feasibility of prescribing the characteristics of a system for
obtaining and using the essential information needed for doing the above
two things’. 47

A vast geographical scope accompanied Camelot’s ambitious aims. According to SORO documents, survey research and field studies would be conducted in the following countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, Iran and Thailand. Fieldwork would be complemented by comparative historical studies of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, France, Greece and Nigeria. 48

In putting together the intellectual and human resources for this grand undertaking, SORO counted upon a pool of elite academics. As SORO’s Director Theodore R. Vallance proudly indicated, his research institute cultivated ‘good working relationships with the topflight behavioral scientists in most of the major institutions around the country’. 49 In the case at hand, 33 consultants hailed from such prestigious institutions as California-Berkeley, MIT, Johns Hopkins, Princeton, Columbia, Michigan, Pittsburgh, Virginia and Stanford. (See Appendix for a complete list of these consultants.)

As for the study’s Director, the military chose Rex D. Hopper, a most suitable candidate. Head of the sociology programme at Brooklyn College, Hopper specialized in Latin American area studies, travelling to that region on numerous occasions to lecture and conduct research. He also had a deep interest in revolution and its scientific management. As early as 1950, he had begun to design a developmental model of revolutionary movements. A generalized description of the revolutionary process, Hopper emphasized, ‘is a necessary prerequisite to any attempt at control’. 50

Camelot incorporated many features characteristic of military-sponsored work that made it attractive to leading scholars. To begin with, Camelot offered the opportunity to do sophisticated scientific work, including the construction of social systems models for entire societies, and studies in nation-building. Both areas of research had been receiving substantial support from leading private and public patrons of post-WWII academic social science. In addition, the military discussed this study in the terms of ‘basic science’. Of course, Camelot was not undirected research stemming solely from intellectual curiosity. But neither did the official viewpoint depict Camelot as an applied, technical task. Instead, the picture presented by DOD suggested that the two sides, academic and military, were working in a mutually supportive relationship, to develop social research with substantial scholarly importance and policy payoffs. 51

Perhaps as a sign of respect for Camelot’s scholarly status, this study, despite its obvious foreign policy concerns, was not even classified.

Furthermore, since counter-insurgency research brought together investigators from a broad range of social science disciplines, scholars in
search of policy-relevant knowledge would not be hindered by common disciplinary constraints. As Seymour Deitchman, Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency, explained, all of the major social disciplines were needed to understand the very real-world matters of concern:

The [cold] war itself revolves around the allegiance and support of the local population. The Defense Department has therefore recognized that part of its research and development efforts to support counterinsurgency operations must be oriented toward the people, United States and foreign, involved in this type of war; and the DOD has called on the types of scientists – anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, economists – whose professional orientation to human behavior would enable them to make useful contributions in this area.52

SORO itself, added director Vallance, had over one hundred social researchers with diverse disciplinary backgrounds.53 Like much of the work done at MIT’s Center for International Studies, RAND, and other military-funded research centres, Camelot would pursue interdisciplinary work matched to current policy needs.

The project’s name resonated with the Kennedy and Johnson administrations’ growing confidence in social engineering as the key to social harmony. ‘Camelot’, explained Vallance, referred to the Arthurian legend about ‘the development of a stable society with domestic tranquility and peace and justice for all. This is an objective that seemed to, if we were going to have a code label, connote the right sort of things’.54 After Kennedy’s death, ‘Camelot’ had also become associated with his legendary idealism and youthful vigour.

Last but not least, the anticipation of bountiful funding suggested Camelot’s great importance, as well as its obvious attraction to action intellectuals. Camelot’s unprecedentedly large budget would be as much as $6 million, to be distributed over a four-year period. Moreover, director Vallance referred to Camelot as a pilot or ‘feasibility’ study. If all went well, bigger projects would follow.55 Presumably, Camelot would provide valuable data and an important learning environment for researchers working on future studies. The final stage of this effort, noted Army Chief of Research and Development William W. Dick, Jr, would be the production of ‘a single model which could be used to estimate the internal war potential of a developing nation’.56

No wonder that one participant suggested that Camelot would serve as the Manhattan Project for the social sciences. Another Camelot participant heard – perhaps only a rumour – that Camelot, or a follow-up study, might eventually receive as much as $50 million annually. Writing a few years later, the anthropologist Ralph Beals speculated in a similar vein that . . .

... the full implementation of the Camelot proposal would have required the involvement of social scientists on a scale comparable to the involvement of physical scientists and engineers with putting a man on the moon.57

So, whether they were under the military’s enlightened scientific guidance, or whether they were providing scientific guidance to the military as it
ventured into new and dangerous terrain, the social sciences were moving
toward the political centre stage, apparently destined for greatness.

The Politics–Patronage–Social Science Nexus Under Scrutiny

On the road to Camelot, however, something went very wrong. In 1965,
US troop commitments to the Vietnam War rose dramatically, triggering a
corresponding increase in domestic anti-war sentiment and protests. As a
result, during the second half of the 1960s, relations between the national-
security state and academia became embedded in divisive arguments about
the nature of American society and its rôle on the world stage. Of special
relevance, universities themselves became major centres of political debate
and social activism in the anti-war movement. Campus protests against the
so-called Establishment identified scholars and their academic institutions
as integral components of the American war machine. According to a
growing number of distressed voices, American scientists and other parts
of the academy had sold their souls to the forces of evil, now disguised in
official double-speak as the benevolent protector of the free world.58

In this context, Project Camelot became a main event, serving as the
first major focal point of national discussion about the use and abuse of
social science by the State. If social scientists were working for the military
(or for the government more generally), was their work going to be
influenced by current policy objectives? If so, was social science destined to
serve power? Or could social scientists, even while dependent on powerful
patrons for support, maintain a fair measure of freedom and critical
perspective in designing, conducting and interpreting research? As many
commentators now saw it, contrary to the pervasive post-WWII rhetoric
about increasing scientific rigour and objectivity in the social or behav-
ioural sciences, the politics–patronage–social science nexus had under-
mined claims about the ideological and political purity of American social
science. Thus in the glare of the public spotlight, post-war efforts that
appealed to a unified, objective scientific enterprise as a means of manag-
ing the political meaning and intellectual status of the social sciences began
to unravel rapidly.

Since Camelot served as a catalyst, not the original spark, in a debate
with deep roots in the scholarly community, it is important first to note
some of the emerging academic concerns about mainstream social science
that had by the early 1960s been gaining strength. Although it would be
impossible to do justice here to the full range of these concerns, brief
mention of some of the more relevant ones helps to set the stage for the
Camelot controversy.

One source of frustration within a variety of fields of study involved
certain pervasive social-science assumptions about human beings and
society that contradicted commonsense notions about the wilful nature of
human action and the value of personal autonomy. Within psychology, for
instance, practitioners who were unhappy with the mechanistic and deter-
ministic models offered by the dominant behaviourist and psychoanalytic
schools, championed a new approach called ‘humanistic psychology’. One of their leaders, Abraham Maslow, represented many of them in his insistence that an adequate psychology required careful attention to such basic human traits as freedom, morality and spiritual growth.59

Critics were also uneasy about the mainstream’s commitment to value-neutrality, and to related professional ideals that suggested scholars needed to remain objective (and thus disinterested) when it came to questions about political and moral ends. Along with humanistic psychologists, vocal scholars in sociology and political science found the notion that research could, and should only, be concerned with means and not ends problematic. The extent of this concern became clearer in the debate over the so-called end-of-ideology thesis. Put forth in the 1950s by prominent intellectuals like the sociologist Daniel Bell and the political scientist Seymour Martin Lipset, this thesis said that the development of social and political thought within the United States was converging on a remarkably widespread agreement over fundamental aims. Thus the nation could now focus on the best ways of achieving such aims. But the debate over this thesis revealed that, in fact, there remained substantial scholarly interest in discussing the ends of social life, as well as a desire shared by many scholars to address the matter of fundamental principles directly in their writings.60

In 1964, in a remarkable effort to synthesize such challenges to the social science mainstream, Floyd W. Matson, who at the end of the 1960s became president of the newly-formed professional association for humanistic psychologists, proposed that it was time to rethink the nature of the social sciences. Trying to discern what a variety of unorthodox scholarly trends added up to, Matson concluded that the mainstream had produced a ‘broken image’ of human nature. This image diminished human beings by offering them an impoverished understanding of themselves and society. Furthermore, this image lent itself to a manipulative orientation that saw human beings as objects to be studied, observed, analysed, and ultimately controlled by supposedly objective scientific experts. This broken image, Matson argued, was due in no small part to the long history of unsuccessful efforts to apply the viewpoint of Newtonian physical science to the study of human beings.61

The case of Project Camelot took these concerns about deficiencies in mainstream scholarship, concerns that had mainly been confined to scholarly discussion, placed them in the national spotlight, and thus transformed the character of that discussion. The public setting involved a wider range of participants. It also gave discontented scholars a broader public audience and greater visibility within the academy, as social scientists now testified before Congress about the connections among national politics, military patronage and the academy; politicians considered proposals to restructure those connections; and the national press offered frequent coverage of the many complex issues. There thus emerged a widespread controversy about the relationship between social science and the national-
security state, and especially about the implications of military patronage for the social science enterprise.

The turmoil began in a location geographically distant from the United States, but well within the scope of American foreign policy interests. In April of 1965, Hugo Nutini, a Chilean-born assistant professor of anthropology at the University of Pittsburgh, went to Chile, apparently on a recruiting mission. He met with Chilean scholars and Alvaro Bunster, the Secretary-General of the University of Chile, to discuss what Nutini characterized as a social science project involving top US scholars from a variety of disciplines. When asked about the project’s sources of support, Nutini, who had been involved in Camelot’s planning, replied that funds came from the civilian National Science Foundation and various universities.62

Bunster was suspicious, however, in part because this study had a code name. After reading a project outline, he became convinced that Camelot was ‘political in nature’, and that it posed ‘a grave threat’ to his nation’s sovereignty. At about that same time, Johan Galtung, a Norwegian social scientist who had already declined to participate in Camelot after his concerns about its unsavoury political aspects had not been satisfactorily addressed, shared what he knew with Chilean scholars. Troubled, they then confronted Nutini, who responded by denying that he had had knowledge that he had been working for nefarious ends, and promised to sever his connections with the study.

But Chilean intellectuals and nationalists in the Chilean government were still worried about the political implications of Project Camelot. Their fears were probably heightened by the fact that American troops had recently been stationed in the Dominican Republic amidst a political crisis, suggesting that Camelot, though its planning documents did not list Chile as a country of study, might be part of American preparations to intervene in Chilean affairs. In August, a member of the Chilean Senate named Aniceto Rodriguez denounced Nutini as a ‘degraded Chilean who disowned his country to become a Yankee spy’. The Chilean government subsequently banned Nutini from returning to his homeland. In December, the Chilean Select Chamber of Deputies unanimously approved an extensive report portraying Project Camelot as ‘an attempt against the dignity, sovereignty, and independence of states and peoples and against the right of the latter to self-determination’.63

Elsewhere, anti-American voices used Camelot as a case in point about American imperialistic ambitions. According to Radio Moscow, Camelot revealed that the Pentagon was ‘plotting to subjugate Latin America’. From the Soviet Union, Tass regarded this study as a ‘vivid illustration of the growing efforts of the Pentagon to take into its own hands the conduct of U.S. foreign policy’. Havana Radio in Cuba and Politica, a Soviet-subsidized magazine published in Mexico City, both warned that such studies were part of a sinister plot to thwart national wars of liberation and overthrow duly elected governments.64
Within the United States, international outcry from abroad triggered a series of communications involving the US ambassador to Chile, the State Department, the military, and the White House, leading in July of 1965 to Camelot’s cancellation. The cancellation of many other studies in various countries followed. In the coming years, the conduct of social research by American scholars in many Latin American countries became difficult, and sometimes impossible.  

If foreign critics saw Camelot as a thoroughly political endeavour, so did a post-mortem investigation by the US Congress, though with a big difference, as the viewpoint here was favourable toward military-sponsored social science. The congressional Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, which had already been studying the rôle of ideological factors in American foreign policy, placed Camelot squarely in relationship to American foreign policy objectives. Florida Democrat Dante B. Fascell, the head of the subcommittee, assured the military that it could ‘get all the money’ for such research that it wanted ‘without much question’, because this research obviously strengthened ‘national security’. In the subcommittee’s final report, the military’s growing commitment to the development and use of the social sciences to further US interests also received firm support. Not incidentally, this report employed military imagery in describing the social sciences as ‘one of the vital tools in the arsenal of the free societies’. Other subcommittee publication titles highlighted the close alliance between social science and Cold War objectives. The transcript of the subcommittee’s 1965 hearings on Project Camelot, together with its final report, was printed under the title *Behavioral Sciences and the National Security*, one of many publications in a series on *Winning the Cold War: The US Ideological Offensive*.  

For social scientists who believed in the value of military-sponsored research, the subcommittee’s assessment was excellent news. Sociologist Robert A. Nisbet remarked that he could ‘think of nothing more edifying for social scientists than a reading of this two-hundred-page document; edifying and flattering’. (Yet there was a touch of sarcasm in this comment since Nisbet, as noted below, was critical of Project Camelot.) Ithiel de Sola Pool, a political scientist and a major figure at MIT’s Center for International Studies, had long been involved in research related to foreign policy. The public clamour over the defunct study gave him a chance to expand on, as he put it a bit awkwardly, ‘The Necessity for Social Scientists Doing Research for Governments’. ‘The social sciences’, Pool proposed, had assumed the responsibility of training the ‘mandarins of the twentieth century’. Previously this had been the task of the humanities. But in the modern world Pool saw that ‘the only hope for humane government in the future is through the extensive use of the social sciences by government’.  

But growing turmoil within the government and larger society about the course of American foreign policy in Vietnam and elsewhere also prompted more caustic comments about Camelot’s political or ideological meaning. Senator William J. Fulbright, a Democrat from Arkansas and
former university president at the University of Arkansas, was well known for creating a major international scholarly exchange programme bearing his name. He took a great interest in higher education, and worried extensively about its military connections. According to his scathing assessment, beneath the ‘jargon of “science”’, in Project Camelot lay a reactionary, backward-looking policy opposed to change.

Implicit in Camelot, as in the concept of ‘counterinsurgency’, is an assumption that revolutionary movements are dangerous to the interests of the United States and that the United States must be prepared to assist, if not actually to participate in, measures to repress them.69

While the movement of the social sciences toward the political centre stage had much to recommend it according to Pool and the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, Camelot looked troublesome to Senator Fulbright and foreign critics like Galtung because Camelot, its scientific pretensions notwithstanding, had obvious ties to deeply controversial political objectives.

Meanwhile, as Seymour Deitchman later wrote, the press had a ‘field day’, bringing ‘DOD’s supposed misbehavior to public account’.70 For example, one article discussing military patronage in The Nation, a weekly magazine, despaired that ‘federal research money has for a long while been a barb sunk deep in the soft flesh of the universities . . . they no longer struggle’.71

In this charged national context, American scholars wrote extensively about the politics–patronage–social science nexus, exposing the underlying assumptions about social stability and revolutionary activities, the conservative political values, and the managerial mind-set implicit in Project Camelot, and in military-funded studies more globally. A close look at the language used by scholars and military personnel associated with counter-insurgency research helped to reveal Camelot’s negative stance toward revolution and in favour of social stability. Counter-insurgency specialists, as pointed out by the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins, characterized Camelot as a study within the field of ‘epidemiology’. They identified revolutionary developments as ‘antisystem activities’ and ‘destabilizing processes’. In considering nations caught up in such developments, these specialists used medical metaphors to support a diagnosis of ‘social pathology’, while they proposed that revolution spread through a process of ‘contagion’. Counter-insurgency experts went on to recommend a type of social engineering as appropriate treatment, something called ‘insurgency prophylaxis’, which would be administered by the United States Army. Presumably, social scientists would prescribe and help administer this treatment. In this view of things, social scientists and the military performed the humanitarian tasks normally assigned to doctors. Their patients, however, were social movements or entire countries, not individuals. Clearly, Cold War priorities guided social science judgements about what constituted ‘national sickness’, and what should be done in order to restore afflicted nations to ‘good health’.72
To show that Camelot was committed to the concern for social stability embedded in official US policies toward the so-called Third World, it helped to imagine how the study of revolution could assume a different orientation. This was the tack taken by Herbert Blumer, a founding figure of symbolic interactionism within sociology. Blumer proposed that one could ask, though Camelot planners did not,

... how insurgency could be encouraged and promoted ... how agitation could be organized and facilitated, how passions could be aroused and dissidence mobilized for action, how weak and vulnerable points in the social structure could be detected and exploited, and how control by a dominant elite could be undermined.73

Others placed the conservative political bias in social research in the historical context of American imperialism. Before social scientists had made their presence known in Central America, American business, often with protection from the American military, had descended upon that region. Foreigners, explained Robert Nisbet, now had good reason to infer that the ‘American research industry’ was entering its ‘imperialist phase’. If so, American scholars, like American capitalists, were hardly welcome: ‘the rape of national dignity by American academic enterprise is as repugnant to foreign feeling as rape by American business or government’.74

Against this background, the fact that DOD described Project Camelot as a basic science project, rather than a political one, seemed peculiar as well as troubling. One DOD paper said that

Project Camelot will employ a scientific approach, that is to say, it is an objective, fact-finding study concerned with what is and not with what ought to be. It will not formulate value statements concerning the adoption of any particular policy but will provide a possible basis for policy.75

SORO’s director Theodore Vallance claimed that it was ‘an objective, nonnormative study concerned with what is or might be and not with what ought to be’. But even Vallance acknowledged at another point that this study had two different supporting arguments, one political and the other scientific.76 Yet the line of analysis articulated by Fulbright, Sahlins and others made the case that a political orientation pervaded this study’s conceptualization from the start. Indeed, the boundary between politics and social science seemed to have disappeared.

Just as problematic, scholars associated with Camelot were not necessarily aware that they were engaged in such a thoroughly value-laden investigation, with only a thinly-veiled ideological bent favouring the suppression of revolutionary developments. Many of them had studied and worked for the past couple of decades in professional contexts that placed great weight on a purportedly objective, value-neutral, apolitical form of scholarly inquiry modelled after an idealized image of the natural sciences. Military research programmes had reinforced this self-understanding. So these scholars might easily fail to see that their work supported the established order and its underlying conservative principles. Herbert
Kelman, chair of the Doctoral Program in Social Psychology at the University of Michigan, suggested that the reason for this blindspot was not hard to grasp:

One can easily fail to notice the role of value preferences when he works within the frame of reference of the status quo, since its value assumptions are so much second nature to members of the society that they perceive them as part of objective reality.77

Sociologist Irving Louis Horowitz agreed, as he testified before Congress, wrote extensively on the politics and ethics of social research, and probably did more than any other social scientist to draw attention to the wide range of worrisome issues concerning military patronage of academic social research. Like Kelman, Horowitz surmised that many social scientists had adopted the values of the ‘Establishment’ to such an extent that it seemed to them as if these values had disappeared. But the truth was quite different; in their effort to avoid normative commitments, they accepted as beyond challenge the prevailing social arrangements, power structures and cultural norms. As a result, their research and conclusions about social reality supported the status quo.78

In these political and scholarly commentaries, the power of the military patron to shape the course of research in directions congenial to official Cold War policy goals occupied a prominent place. While the danger that patrons would impose their interests on scholarly research had often seemed manageable during the 1940s and 1950s, the case of Camelot encouraged an alternative, darker conclusion. Scholars, of course, did not have to accept military money. But once they did, it seemed unlikely that they would (or could) pursue work that challenged military operations and American foreign policy aims. ‘The Army’, asserted Irving Horowitz in a discussion of the compromised rôle of social scientists, was ‘“hiring help” . . . not openly and honestly submitting a problem to the higher professional and scientific authority of social science’.79

As a result, social scientists working under military contract would be led to accept the premises, at least in the context of their research, that revolution was harmful and established governments allied with the United States were to be preferred. As ‘research that is tied to foreign policy or military operations is, of necessity, conceived within the framework of existing policy’, observed Herbert Kelman, ‘... it does not fulfil the function of providing new frameworks that would not normally emerge out of the policy-making apparatus itself’.80 Similarly, Herbert Blumer recognized that ‘in responding to the practical interest and policy orientation of the [funding] agency’, research takes on an ‘“ideological” slant’.81

Moreover, the professional social scientist in this situation could easily end up in the rôle of a social-control-minded technician or engineer. After first accepting the sponsor’s objectives as a given, a researcher typically focused solely on determining the best means to achieve them. As Pio E. Uliassi has it, since ‘sponsored work must be roughly consonant with the basic values and outlooks of its sponsors’, the social scientist tends to
adopt ‘an “engineering” conception of his role’. Such a limited vision of the scholar’s rôle led self-identified ‘responsible, non-ideological experts’ to confine themselves to offering ‘advice on tactical questions’, added the linguist and outspoken critic of American foreign policy, Noam Chomsky. Meanwhile, it was other so-called ‘irresponsible “ideological types” ’ who raised a storm about ‘principles . . . moral issues and human rights’.

Actions taken by the Executive Branch shortly after Camelot’s cancellation only strengthened political and scholarly concerns about the subordination of social science to the State, a resulting technocratic orientation, and a more general intellectual myopia. After the blow-up in Chile over Camelot, the State Department initiated correspondence with the White House about the problems of keeping publicly-funded social research from provoking foreign hostility. Subsequently, a letter from President Johnson to Secretary of State Dean Rusk – the letter was initially drafted by the State Department – outlined the need for a review process to prevent future social science projects from damaging the image of the United States. Previously, each agency had been responsible for reviewing projects according to its own criteria, though an effort to improve co-ordination on a voluntary basis had been made in 1964, when the Council on Foreign Affairs Research (FAR) was established to coordinate and plan research on foreign areas for some two dozen agencies. To meet the President’s request, FAR received orders to establish a set of review procedures. In order to avoid meddling in the affairs of agencies that had ostensibly academic purposes, the new review procedures only pertained to research projects with obvious ties to national foreign policy objectives, and that thus might elicit international protest.

Despite this important limitation, the federal checkpoint to prevent future social science fiascos came under fire from those who worried that the Establishment was showing no respect for scholarly freedom. Alfred de Grazia, editor of the American Behavioral Scientist, had previously been a member of Project Camelot’s design team. As he saw things, State Department officials had no reason to be proud of what they were doing. The new review procedures would probably impede the advance of the social sciences and, what was worse, might therefore harm the national defence effort. Though Irving Horowitz was critical of Project Camelot, he found it appalling that Camelot had been terminated due to foreign policy considerations, a result that represented, in his words, ‘a decisive setback for social science research’. Since the new review procedures were concerned not with scholarly merit but international sensitivities, Horowitz found these invidious as well.

Such worries about the limitations on scholarly autonomy also surfaced inside the prestigious National Academy of Sciences (NAS). During NAS’s first century, its interest in the social sciences had been limited to anthropology and psychology. But in the early 1960s, the Academy created a Division of Behavioral Sciences so as to bring in representatives from other social disciplines whose work, as the ‘behavioral sciences’ label implied, was sufficiently ‘scientific’, and thus would command the respect
of the Academy's natural-science leaders. Regarding the new review pro-
cess, the Division of Behavioral Sciences' executive committee complained
that by sponsoring the directive from President Johnson, the State Depart-
ment had 'aimed a dagger at the independent integrity of the behavioral
sciences'.87 A declassified document in NAS archives indicates that due to
heightened national security regulations, preserving the independence of
academic social science became, following Camelot's demise, even more
difficult. In August of 1965, Harold Brown, the Director of Defense
Research and Engineering, presented new security guidelines in a memo-
andum to the assistant secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and
the director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency. These guidelines
are worth quoting at some length because of their wide scope:

Sensitive aspects of work having primary interest to the US Government
(as opposed to a foreign government) must be treated in such a way that
offense to foreign governments and propaganda advantage to the com-

unmunist apparatus are avoided. This means that task statements, contracts,
working papers, reports, etc. which refer to US assistance or potential US
assistance to foreign countries in the internal defense area; or which
express US concern over internal violence or revolution, whether com-

unist inspired or not; or which refer to the development or examination
of US policies for the purpose of influencing allied policies or actions; or
which could imply US interference or intervention in the internal affairs
of a foreign government, will have to be classified and marked as not for
disclosure to foreign nationals except where a specific and well-considered
exception is made.88

There is a glaring irony in this move to beef up security: though concerns
about military influence on the social sciences had originally erupted over
Project Camelot, an unclassified study, the official response resulted in
further subordination of social science to non-academic authorities.

If military funding by itself might take the social sciences down a
conservative political path, alarmed observers recognized that the extensive
imposition of secrecy by federal authorities only raised the likelihood that
the critical capacities of scholars would be compromised. Regarding the
struggle between the scholar's professional interest in publishing in the
open literature and the government's interest in keeping privileged in-
formation secret, Irving Horowitz surmised that the latter often won,
mainly due to the imbalance in power between buyer and seller. Because
classified research placed severe limits on the open discussion and eval-
uation of scholarly ideas, the heightened security measures were especially
problematic.89

One could pursue the extensive public controversy over Camelot and
these subsequent developments further, but the analysis so far already
shows how deeply this controversy challenged conventional notions about
the relations among national politics, military patronage, and American
social science. Alarmed participants from the scholarly and political com-

unities feared that military patronage was turning social scientists into
servants of established interests, with questionable implications for social
science scholarship. Often starting from the same basic premise put forth
by foreign critics (namely, that social research was a tool of American imperialism), American commentators argued that military patronage deeply influenced the shape of academic social science; that researchers working with military funds were compromising their scholarly freedom, objectivity and integrity; and that the social sciences were in grave danger of becoming technocratic servants to the powers that be. In sum, the road to Camelot, rather than leading to a peaceful and just society guided by impartial, objective behavioural scientists, had thrust action-oriented scholars into the public spotlight where the mantle of objectivity, value-neutrality and professional autonomy received a barrage of stinging criticism.

Broader Implications for the Social Science Enterprise: Patronage, Ideology, Value-Neutrality

The controversy over Camelot quickly became entangled with other national problems that drew further critical attention to the politics–patronage–social science nexus. Not only did this controversy lead almost immediately, in 1965, to heightened security requirements for federally sponsored social research; in the coming years, previously hidden or little-discussed arrangements linking social science to the national-security state and the Vietnam War were also subjected to public scrutiny. For example, it became well known that a group of Michigan State social scientists had received CIA funds to support their work with police forces in the South Vietnam government.90 At the same time, the emergence of widespread public criticism of various domestic programmes, especially the War on Poverty and related social welfare initiatives, substantially broadened the discussion about the political and ideological dimensions of American social science, and the institutional arrangements that brought social science experts to bear on national policy.91

Given this complicated picture, it is perhaps impossible to isolate and pin down with great precision the broader implications of the Camelot controversy; nevertheless, it is possible to identify certain salient issues in this controversy that became part of important efforts to rethink and reform the social science enterprise. A brief look at three areas – patronage, ideology, and value-neutrality – reveals more fully Camelot’s legacy, and the centrality of political issues in the evolution of unorthodox epistemological positions.

Concerned participants in the Camelot controversy feared, as we have seen, that social science had become (or was rapidly becoming) subservient to political power. The problem seemed especially deep in the case of foreign area research, which in 1966 alone received almost $36 million from the military and other governmental sources of support.92 That same year, the year after Camelot’s cancellation, the Senate Subcommittee on Government Research held hearings on social research on foreign areas. Subcommittee chairman Fred R. Harris, a Democrat from Oklahoma,
drew attention to the militarization, or what he called the ‘overmilitarization’, of social science. Elsewhere, Noam Chomsky warned his readers about the problem of counter-insurgency or counter-revolutionary subordination in American scholarship. Just as American intellectuals during the Cold War often pointed to the overwhelming pressures on scholars in communist countries to support the Party line, Chomsky pointed to the integration of American scholars into the State apparatus as the basis for an uncritical commitment to the US government’s anti-revolutionary outlook. From this viewpoint, the question for the social sciences was how they could be restored to good health.

One widespread response focused on the corrosive impact of patronage, and especially the partnership with the military. Regarding this topic, the Camelot controversy, by generating concern about the harmful impact of military patronage on the critical capacities of social scientists, proved to be of singular importance. Though the initial 1965 congressional investigation by the House Subcommittee on International Organization and Movements issued a decidedly favourable report on military social science programmes, that same report noted the danger, previously pointed to in Eisenhower’s farewell address, that greatly increased federal support for American science would undermine the independence of the academic enterprise. The following year, in 1966, the work of Senator Harris’s Subcommittee revealed that fear about the ‘overmilitarization’ of the social sciences had spread within the political and scholarly communities.

In this context, the idea of strengthening scholarly integrity by severing ties with national-security agencies received extensive consideration. Decades before, the famous anthropologist Franz Boas had bemoaned the participation of his academic colleagues as spies in World War I. Now, in the wake of Project Camelot, leaders of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) warned the public of a similar problem on the op-ed pages of the New York Times:

Attempts to utilize scientific research programs . . . to cloak activities with non-scholarly or non-scientific purposes seriously threaten the integrity of the discipline and the execution of legitimate scientific research. The criteria of legitimate scientific research activities include full disclosure of sponsorship, of sources of funds, and of the purposes of the research, and public reporting of results, subject to the proper protection of the personal privacy of those studied or assisting the research. The gathering of information and data which can never be made available to the public does not constitute scientific research and should not be so represented.

The anthropologist Ralph Beals subsequently undertook, on behalf of the AAA, an extensive study of politics and ethics in social research, finding that the problems of clandestine research were, indeed, pervasive. He estimated that the CIA employed perhaps as many as 1000 social scientists. Intelligence operations more generally employed an unknown number. Pointing out that ‘virtually all such work is classified and its quality cannot be judged’, Beals concluded that
... such activities contribute nothing to the development of the social sciences. Far worse, to the extent that social scientists or persons posing as social scientists use their titles, positions, or research activities to conceal secret intelligence activities, the future of social research is threatened.99

Some people suggested that new federal arrangements were therefore needed to support social science in a manner that did not constrain research in undesirable ways, or force scholarly thinking into an uncritical mould. With this in mind, the Senate Subcommittee on Government Research emerged as an advocate for a new, civilian social science agency. The idea for such a separate agency had first arisen during the 1940s’ National Science Foundation legislative debate, but as national science policy concentrated at that time on the natural sciences, this proposal had received little attention. By the mid-1960s, the scene had changed notably, as growing concern about the ill effects of military patronage combined with strong support within the Johnson administration for using the social sciences to improve domestic affairs. Under these conditions, Senator Harris concluded – though wrongly as it turned out – that a National Social Science Foundation would be viable. He argued that such an agency should encourage social scientists to pursue work on controversial matters that challenged current political policies or widespread social practices and beliefs.100

In the following decades, the possibility that patronage could shape the social sciences (and science more generally) became a widely debated and contentious matter, continuing to challenge the claims of those who maintained that the funding of social science research did not mean that such research was directed by extra-scientific social interests. A small subfield of scholarly study focused on the influence of philanthropic support in the development of American social science.101 This literature was complemented by studies that focused on, as one author put it, ‘government influence on the social science paradigm’.102 Then there was a much larger body of scholarship arguing that patronage was a key factor shaping the context, conduct and content of science.103

Second, Camelot’s legacy underscored the problem of ideology in social science, a problem that scientific leaders and other observers of the scientific scene in the post-WWII years had tried to resolve by banishing ideology (along with politics) from legitimate scientific inquiry. As a highly visible and extensively discussed example of a large-scale social science project that would incorporate cutting-edge research and theory and yet was riddled with a conservative bias, Camelot helped to alert the scholarly imagination to the possibility that ideology, together with subjective, social commitments that lay beyond empirical demonstration might, in fact, be frequently present in American social science.

Because of Camelot’s particular concern with revolutionary movements in developing countries, this study had special relevance for the ideological underpinnings of the field of foreign area studies, where research on modernization had been enthusiastically pursued. Before the mid-1960s, the presence of ideology in development studies had not been
recognized by the mainstream as a problem. Social scientists had pro-
ceeded with confidence, assuming that their studies offered an objective, rational and scientific (as opposed to a subjective, emotional and ideologi-
cal) analysis of the major problems confronting developing nations. These scholars then discussed how these problems could be overcome with expert-guided development pursued within a framework of social stability (and thus these countries could avoid the dangers of revolution and communist penetration). The uproar over Camelot helped to call into question this confidence, as critics began to emphasize that such scholar-
ship was grounded in a value-laden vision that took an idealized picture of the history of the United States, and then presented it inappropriately as a model for ‘Third World’, ‘underdeveloped’, ‘developing’, or, in the most explicitly pejorative language, ‘backward’ nations.104

This challenge to the post-war social science orthodoxy contributed to an emerging crisis within area studies. As political scientist Irene Gendzier puts it, through the Camelot controversy, ‘the alleged neutrality of social science research was exploded before the evidence of complicity between well-known scholars of development and political change, and the policy planners in charge of the military operations in Southeast Asia’. As concerns about the moral and cognitive basis of development studies mounted, proponents of new opposing scholarly paradigms proposed that power inequalities led to the dependence of developing nations on (rather than their independence from) the United States and other dominant powers.105

In another assault on the mainstream’s commitment to the separation of social science from ideology, critics took aim at the extensive bodies of research incorporating functionalist and social systems theories. Prominent scholars like Harvard sociologist Talcott Parsons had promoted these theories as part of a comprehensive scientific edifice for understanding and predicting the interactions of various components or subsystems of a society. This work tended to emphasize the functional integration of these components, noting how a social system maintained itself, and thus did not disintegrate. Project Camelot’s design plans had drawn upon these ideas for obvious reasons: American counter-insurgency policy during the 1960s included programmes for development in a manner intended to reinforce social stability. As governmental policies lost more and more public support, this concern with stability came under fire as a social science prop for the embattled status quo. Again, Camelot served as a case in point, as Marshall Sahlins observed that ‘what had been for some time a cultural common-law marriage between scientific functionalism and the natural interest of a leading world power in the status quo became under the aegis of Project Camelot an explicit and legitimate union’.106 For Irving Horowitz, Camelot provided ‘the final proof, if such were necessary, that the functionalist credo of order, stability, pattern maintenance, stress management, and so forth indeed reveals strong conservative drives’.107

Lying just beyond the problem of ideology in social research was a third piece of Camelot’s legacy that challenged the dominant postwar
emphasis on the value-neutral rôle of the social scientist. The case of Camelot suggested to many observers that a conservative bias in social science reflected a particularly narrow conception of the scholar as a handmaiden to power, a conception now seen to be firmly rooted in this same conservative bias. The labels ‘action-intellectual’ or ‘policy scientist’ implied that social scientists, who in the earlier postwar years had often been marginal to high-level scientific and political discussions, were now well inside the corridors of power. Nevertheless, the scholar entered only as a servant of power, an advisor to those who had real power. Since, as Camelot’s critics observed, this advisory rôle did not encourage debate over fundamental principles, social scientists often took a managerial, technocratic view of social problems. This point also surfaced in the related debate over the end of ideology. But by the mid-1960s, growing frustrations with major domestic and foreign policies helped to draw attention to the support provided by social scientists to these same policies, rendering the claims of political impartiality (and thus value-neutrality) suspect.

Perhaps, then, it was time to reject the value-neutral stance as deceitful, and even socially naïve. Robert Boguslaw, a scientist and former member of Camelot’s design team, wrote extensively about the rise of systems analysis in the social sciences. In his view, if the social sciences were to make the most of their opportunities to influence the larger society, these disciplines had to adopt a new conception of the scholar’s rôle:

As social science begins to emerge from the morass of inconsequentiality in which so much of it has for so long been embedded, its obligation to develop more sophisticated methods for normative analysis becomes urgent. It can no longer afford to relegate this subject to the obscurity of philosophy texts or to the sporadic emotional outbursts of its practitioners. In the absence of progress in normative analysis, the efforts of social scientists and the content of social science are guided by the subtle controls implicit in a ‘value-free ideology’.¹⁰⁸

In thinking about the broader problems raised by Camelot, Boguslaw recommended that scholars (re)turn to ‘normative analysis’, welcoming a moral perspective in social science inquiry, rather than denying that one existed or trying to excise it, as orthodox practitioners wanted to do.

Reorienting the social scientist toward normative inquiry could, additionally, help to curb the much-criticized tendency of social scientists to adopt a dehumanizing managerial outlook. Social scientists needed to think hard about the moral implications of their work, or else they would probably end up reinforcing the dehumanizing tendencies of modern society, argued Herbert Kelman. Counter-insurgency research, with its emphasis on producing knowledge that would facilitate the control of other nations and their peoples, represented in Kelman’s analysis a good example of this worrisome streak in modern scholarship. As an antidote, Kelman called on social scientists to make the support of human freedom and dignity an explicit professional goal.¹⁰⁹

In these various ways, Camelot’s implications nurtured continuing doubts about the validity, and even the desirability, of the objective social
science model: Camelot contributed to the efforts to reconsider the impact of the rôle of patronage and its ‘extra-scientific’ social interests on the content of social science, the place of ideology in social research, and the value-neutral conception of the social scientist’s social rôle.

The overall impact was summed up well by two social scientists who, in the late 1960s, undertook extensive studies of American politics and American social science. The sociologist Gene Lyons was the author of a book about what he called ‘The Uneasy Partnership’ between the social sciences and the federal government in the 20th century. As Lyons saw it, one of the most troubling aspects of the Camelot controversy was the realization on the part of many scholars of ‘the extent to which they were accepting and supporting the premises of official policy when they undertook military-sponsored research, no matter how basic the investigation’. Thus no matter how hard they tried in their own work to be objective, no matter how rigorous their scientific methodology, no matter how impartial their professional outlook, their work was still likely to be shaped by patronage relations that infused their research with a political bias.

To return to the quotation with which I opened this paper: in the book based upon his study about social science and ethics for the American Anthropological Association, Ralph Beals remarked that Camelot was surely not the first instance of ‘the influence of political decisions and climates on social research’. But what was new was the ‘fact’ that this political influence could ‘no longer be ignored’; and Beals continued:

Camelot, a proposed international social science research project sponsored by the Army Research Office of the United States Department of Defense, was the turning point.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the fascinating story of Project Camelot, from its roots in the post-war partnership between American social science and the military, its immediate origins in DOD’s counter-insurgency mission of the 1960s, its cancellation in July 1965 at a time of rising anti-Establishment sentiment and activity, the widespread controversy that followed, and some of the broader implications of this controversy that supported continued challenges to scientific objectivity and related ideals, such as value-neutrality and professional autonomy.

In the early post-WWII period, military funding seemed to be helping social scientists in their quest for public respect and scientific legitimacy. But the Camelot controversy contributed to a darker interpretation, according to which the politics–patronage–social science nexus had undermined orthodox claims about the separation of social science from politics and ideology. It seemed that Camelot, and military-sponsored social research more generally, supported official US interest in preserving an unjust world order with the help of expert-guided management of social change and the suppression of revolutionary developments, if those
threatened official goals. Social scientists, far from being impartial, objective scientists, seemed to be servants of power who were wedded to a conservative technocratic viewpoint that disguised their true political character. While the ‘strictly academic’ criticisms of the mainstream that Novick discusses had already been making some impact, the Camelot controversy, I have argued, thrust such concerns into the national spotlight, transforming the discussion by opening it up to a much broader array of participants, and bringing the politics–patronage–social science nexus into the centre of consideration.

Project Camelot’s planners talked about designing a social systems model that could help diagnose social pathology, and assist in indicating an appropriate remedy. In the end, however, critics found that it was the social science enterprise that was sick. Efforts to restore it to good health suggested that it was first necessary to rethink such key issues as the rôle of patronage, the presence of ideology, and the ideal of value-neutrality in American social science.

Appendix

List of Consultants for Project Camelot

Clark C. Abt, president, Abt Associates
Kathleen Archibald, assistant research sociologist, University of California, Berkeley
Jessie Bernard, professor of sociology emeritus, Pennsylvania State University
Frank Bonilla, associate professor of political science, Center for International Studies, MIT
Thomas E. Caywood, partner, Peat, Marwick, Caywood & Schiller
Ira Cisin, professor of sociology, George Washington University
James S. Coleman, professor of sociology, Johns Hopkins University
Lewis Coser, professor of sociology, Brandeis University
Theodore Draper, research associate, Hoover Institute, Stanford University
Harry Eckstein, professor of politics, Princeton University
S.N. Eisenstadt, professor of sociology, Hebrew University
Frederick Frey, associate professor of political science, MIT
William Gamson, associate professor of sociology, University of Michigan
Gino Germani, visiting professor of sociology, Columbia University
W.J. Goode, professor of sociology, Columbia University
Robert Hefner, associate professor of psychology, University of Michigan
Arthur Hoehn, research scientist, Human Resources Research Organization (Hum Rro)
Richard Jung, research associate, Department of Sociology, Cornell University
Notes

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3. There is a large literature about the emergence of professional social science. The most comprehensive study, whose footnotes provide a useful guide to the literature, is Dorothy Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science* (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).


6. Ibid., 546–63, at 546.


25. Bell, ‘The Social Sciences’, op. cit. note 4. Examples of disciplinary histories that point to a heightened postwar emphasis on proper methodology include: David M. Ricci, *Tragedy of Political Science: Politics, Scholarship, and Democracy* (New Haven, CT:

27. See the various task committee reports and the final report of the Smithsonian’s Research Group in Psychology and the Social Sciences, Record Unit 179, Records 1957–1963, Archives and Special Collections of the Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC.


42. Kruschev and China paper quoted in *BSNS*, 71. Kennedy’s address is also discussed in this document.

43. *BSNS*, 72.

44. ‘Congressional Response to Project Camelot’, op. cit. note 2, 128–29.

45. DSB report quoted in *BSNS*, 3R.


47. See Document 1 in Horowitz (ed.), *Rise & Fall of Project Camelot*, op. cit. note 2, 47–49. Documents 1, 2 and 3 in this volume come from SORO documents about Project Camelot from December of 1964. Document 4 comes from a public description of Camelot released by SORO in July of 1965, at about the time when Camelot was cancelled.


51. *BSNS*, 30–32. On Camelot as basic science, also see notes 75–76 below, and the corresponding text [p. 18].

52. Deitchman, in ibid., 72.

53. Vallance, in ibid., 22.

54. Ibid., 20.

55. Ibid., 5.


57. Comment about Manhattan Project noted by Ralph Beals in *Politics of Social Research*, op. cit. note 1, 6; Beals’ own quotation is at 7. Comment about possibility of $50m a year is noted by Marshall Sahlin in ‘The Established Order: Do Not Fold, Spindle, or Mutilate’, in Horowitz (ed.), *Rise & Fall of Project Camelot*, op. cit. note 2, 71–79, at 71.


59. Maslow’s ideas are discussed in Roy Jose DeCarvalho, *The Founders of Humanistic Psychology* (New York: Praeger, 1991), passim.


64. All quoted in William Giandoni (Latin American Editor of Copley News Service), ‘Hemisphere Report: Communists Assail “Operation Camelot”’, p. 3, Box 43, Folder 1, Fred Harris Papers [hereafter, Harris Papers], Carl Albert Center, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma.

65. Silvert, ‘American Academic Ethics’, op. cit. note 62, 80. Yet it should be noted that the military continued to sponsor much social science, including studies along the lines of Project Camelot, often as classified research: see Herman, Romance of American Psychology, op. cit. note 2, 168–70.

66. Fascell’s remarks, and Final Report, in BSNS, 53, 5R.


74. Nisbet, ‘Project Camelot: An Autopsy’, op. cit. note 67, at 338, 323. Nisbet, it should be emphasized, was no critic of scholarly collaboration with the military in general. Assuming that the behavioural sciences were, as many of their practitioners claimed, ‘non-ideological’ and ‘objective’, he saw nothing ‘intrinsically wrong with their conclusions being used by, or given to, the Army’ (316). But even this favourable predisposition toward military social science did not get in the way of his seeing that Project Camelot did not fit such a description.


80. Herbert C. Kelman, ‘The Use of University Resources in Foreign Policy Research’, p. 5 Box 42, Folder 18, Harris Papers.


88. Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research and Development), the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research and Development), the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Research and Development), and the Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency (18 August 1965), Central Policy File Series, Folder: Behavioral Science 1965 Committee on Government Programs in Behavioral Science: Advisory General, NAS Archives.


93. FSISSBR: Senator Harris discusses his concerns throughout the subcommittee’s published hearings.


95. BSNS, 6R.

96. FSISSBR.


98. Stephen Boggs (for the Executive Board, AAA), Letter to the Editor of the New York Times (7 June 1966), reproduced in FSISSBR, 75.

99. Beals, Politics of Social Research, op. cit. note 1, 96–97, and other documents regarding these concerns of anthropologists in Beals’ Appendix B.


110. Lyons, Uneasy Partnership, op. cit. note 41, 169.

111. Beals, Politics of Social Research, op. cit. note 1, 4.

112. BSNS, 62.

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